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Abstract 
Procedural justice concerns play a critical role in economic settings, politics, and other domains 
of human life. Despite the vast evidence corroborating their relevance, considerably less is 
known about how procedural justice judgments are formed. Whereas earlier theorizing focused 
on the systematic integration of content information, the present contribution provides a new 
perspective on the formation of justice judgments by examining the influence of accessibility 
experiences. Specifically, we hypothesize that procedural justice judgments may be formed 
based on the ease or difficulty with which justice-relevant information comes to mind. Three 
experiments corroborate this prediction in that procedures were evaluated less positively when 
the retrieval of associated unfair aspects was easy compared to difficult. Presumably this is 
because when it feels easy (difficult) to retrieve unfair aspects, these are perceived as frequent 
(infrequent), and hence the procedure as unjust (just). In addition to demonstrating that ease-of-
retrieval may influence justice judgments, the studies further revealed that reliance on 
accessibility experiences is high in conditions of personal certainty. We suggest that this is 
because personal uncertainty fosters systematic processing of content information, whereas 
personal certainty may invite less taxing judgmental strategies such as reliance on ease-of-
retrieval.  
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Beyond Procedure’s Content: 
The Role of Accessibility Experiences and Personal Uncertainty in  
Procedural Justice Judgments  
Social perception, affect, attitude, and behavior are known to be strongly influenced by 
justice judgments, which play a major role in many domains of human life (Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002). For instance, justice concerns systematically affect key organizational variables (for 
meta-analytic overviews, see Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001), such as organizational identification (e.g., De Cremer & Blader, 2006) or 
job satisfaction (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). Moreover, individuals are particularly 
sensitive to justice information (e.g., Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005). Despite the 
vast evidence corroborating the relevance of justice judgments and an impressive literature on 
why justice judgments are so relevant (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2003), considerably less is known 
about which source of information these judgments are based on. This is true for justice 
judgments about the outcome of a resource allocation (distributive justice; Adams, 1965), but 
even more so for judgments about the procedure of this resource allocation (procedural justice; 
Thibaut & Walker, 1975). 
To date, most conceptions of procedural justice judgments define characteristics of the 
procedure itself as the main source of judgment relevant information (e.g., if and how a person 
is granted voice over the course of the procedure; Folger, 1977). The present contribution 
identifies so-called cognitive feelings (Clore, 1992) as an additional source of information that 
individuals may draw upon when forming justice judgments. Specifically, we hypothesize that 
experiences of ease or difficulty when retrieving relevant information from memory, generally 
referred to as ease-of-retrieval feelings or accessibility experiences (for reviews, see Schwarz, 
1998, 2004), may be relied upon in the formation of justice judgments. In addition, the present 
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contribution identifies personal uncertainty—the subjective sense of doubt or instability that 
arises when a person experiences unclear or inconsistent self-relevant cognitions (cf. McGregor, 
Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2009)—as an important moderator of 
this reliance. Specifically, we hypothesize that reliance on accessibility experiences is 
particularly pronounced in conditions of personal certainty. What follows is to substantiate these 
two hypotheses. We first focus on the formation of procedural justice judgments and the 
hypothesized role of accessibility experiences, before then addressing the presumed 
moderating impact of personal uncertainty.  
Procedural justice judgments based on content and accessibility experiences 
Procedural justice judgments have been conceptualized as the result of a comparison 
between process characteristics and certain reference points, such as generalized procedural 
rules (Leventhal, 1980), prototypes of just and unjust procedures (Ambrose & Kulik, 2001), or 
counterfactuals (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Common to these models is the assumption that 
the frequency of rule violations (when reference-point and actual process do not match) and the 
distance between the reference-points and the actual process characteristics are used to assess 
how just a process is. Moreover, the models share the focus on content information consciously 
accessible at the time of judgment (e.g., the characteristics of the procedure), whereas other 
sources of information (e.g., accessibility experiences) are not addressed.  
Extending this perspective, the present contribution suggests that individuals may 
estimate the frequency of norm violations by relying on accessibility experiences that 
accompany the retrieval of content information from memory. Specifically, we suggest that 
individuals may form justice-relevant judgments—such as how many norms were violated in a 
given procedure—by relying on the ease or difficulty with which pertinent instances (i.e., 
instances in which reference points and actual characteristics of the procedure do not match) 
can be retrieved from memory. When coming up with aspects of the procedure that are far 
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removed from the corresponding reference points is easy, individuals may conclude that there 
must have been many of these aspects and that the procedure was therefore relatively unjust. 
Conversely, when this task is difficult, individuals may conclude that there could not have been 
many of these aspects and that the procedure was therefore relatively just.  
Although such feeling-based inferences may not appear intuitive on first glance, they 
have received considerable support in other domains of research. Perhaps most important in the 
present context, it has been shown that the frequency of some target is judged to be higher the 
more easily according examples can be retrieved from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
see also Greifeneder & Bless, 2008). Ease-of-retrieval feelings were also observed to influence, 
for instance, judgments about the self (Schwarz et al., 1991), others (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Macrae, 
& Haddock, 1999), and abstract concepts like attitude strength (Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & 
Schwarz, 1999). This short-list of findings suggests that ease-of-retrieval is an important source 
of information that individuals appear to rely on in a variety of judgmental contexts (for a review, 
Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, in press).  
Personal uncertainty moderates reliance on accessibility experiences 
When there is more than one source of information to draw upon, it is interesting to 
understand when the one is preferred over the other. The present contribution focuses on 
personal uncertainty, which is defined as the “subjective sense of doubt or instability in self-
views, world-views, or the interrelation between the two” (Van den Bos & Lind, 2009, p. 124). 
Differences in personal uncertainty may result from situational variation, such as when the 
sudden and unexpected death of a close other shakes one’s world, as well as interindividual 
variation, in that some individuals generally report higher levels of doubts and instabilities than 
others. Note that personal uncertainty is differentiated from informational uncertainty (Van den 
Bos & Lind, 2009), as further discussed later.  
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Because personal uncertainty constitutes an uncomfortable and often aversive state, 
individuals strive to cope with it (Hogg, 2005; Lopes, 1987; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). One 
possibility for coping is to accord particular relevance to fairness information (e.g., De Cremer & 
Sedikides, 2005), especially as individuals have been shown to be less uncertain about 
themselves (Van den Bos, Heuven, Burger, & Van Veldhuizen, 2006) or better able to tolerate 
the uncertainties they are experiencing when treated in fair ways (Greenberg, 2006). Personal 
uncertainty may thus increase the relevance of justice-related concerns. In accordance with 
current conceptions of dual-process theories (see contributions in Chaiken & Trope, 1999), this 
heightened relevance is likely to trigger systematic elaboration of the available content 
information. In contrast, for personally certain individuals, justice-related concerns may be 
relatively less relevant. Personally certain individuals may therefore be expected to resort to less 
effortful processing strategies when forming justice judgments, such as reliance on ease-of-
retrieval (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Attesting to this reasoning, prior research revealed 
that ease-of-retrieval experiences are particularly likely to be relied upon in conditions of low 
processing motivation (e.g., Rothman & Schwarz, 1998).  
Together, these considerations translate in a moderation hypothesis, suggesting that 
personal uncertainty moderates reliance on ease-of-retrieval in procedural justice judgments (for 
a conceptually related argument in the domain of cooperation behavior, see Müller, Greifeneder, 
Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2010). It is interesting to note that this moderation hypothesis 
is conceptually corroborated by findings from De Cremer and Blader (2006), who observed that 
individuals high in need to belong displayed more systematic or careful processing of procedural 
fairness information.  
In what follows, we first establish the primary effect that ease-of-retrieval experiences 
may influence procedural justice judgments (Experiment 1), and then provide evidence on the 
hypothesized moderation. To increase generalizability, the expected moderator, personal 
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uncertainty, is assessed dispositionally (Experiment 2) as well as manipulated situationally 
(Experiment 3).  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate whether individuals rely on experiences of 
ease or difficulty when forming procedural justice judgments. We selected a procedure that 
university students (the population from which participants were drawn) are likely to feel relaxed 
and certain about. Specifically, a well-known nation-wide university admissions procedure was 
chosen, which is primarily based on performance in secondary school and thus marks, for 
university students, the end of a previous life period, which they had successfully mastered.  
To investigate whether individuals rely on accessible content or ease-of-retrieval when 
forming procedural justice judgments, we adapted a paradigm introduced by Schwarz and 
colleagues (1991). In this paradigm—henceforth referred to as ease-of-retrieval paradigm—
participants are asked to recall few versus many pieces of information from memory. Here we 
asked participants to recall two versus four unfair aspects of the admissions procedure. If 
participants rely on content information when evaluating the procedure, they should judge it as 
less just after retrieving many compared to few unfair aspects. After all, the more unfair aspects 
there are, the less just the procedure likely is. In contrast, if participants rely on accessibility 
experiences, they should evaluate the procedure as more just after retrieving many (which is 
difficult) compared to few unfair aspects (which is easy). Presumably, if it is difficult to come up 
with unfair aspects, there cannot be many of them; hence the procedure is probably just. In 
contrast, if it is easy to come up with unfair aspects, chances are that there are many of them; 
hence, the procedure cannot be just. As this description illustrates, the ease-of-retrieval 
paradigm sets the judgmental stage in such a way that opposing results emerge from reliance 
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on content information versus reliance on accessibility experiences. The paradigm thus allows 
for the differentiation between the two information sources.  
In line with a vast body of literature (Schwarz, 1998, 2004), more positive judgments after 
many compared to few negative aspects have been recalled may be interpreted as an indication 
of ease-of-retrieval. Alternatively, however, it has been speculated that such a finding reflects a 
disguised content effect. This argument holds that aspects coming to mind later could potentially 
be of worse quality or of lower extremity than those coming to mind earlier, such that the overall 
quality or extremity of aspects would be different between the few versus many conditions. To 
refute this alternative explanation, Experiment 1 employed a yoked design, in that participants 
either retrieved aspects themselves (writers), or read the aspects retrieved by a yoked 
participant (readers; see Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996). Note that both readers and writers can 
rely on the same content information, but only writers have access to the experience of ease-of-
retrieval associated with retrieving instances from memory. If both readers and writers displayed 
the same pattern of results, this would suggest that both relied on content information. In 
contrast, if only writers display the hypothesized pattern of results, a strong case can be made 
that their judgments are not based on content information, but on ease-of-retrieval.  
In sum, we expected that writers would evaluate the university admission procedure 
more just after recalling many rather than few unfair aspects, because they rely on ease-of-
retrieval. Readers—who do not experience ease-of-retrieval—can only resort to content 
information and were therefore expected to evaluate the procedure less just in the condition of 
many versus few unfair aspects. A parallel pattern of results was predicted for the evaluation of 
the institution overseeing the admission procedure, because justice judgments can have further 
implications for more global judgments, such as organizational attractiveness (Colquitt et al., 
2001). 
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Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight male University of Mannheim students voluntarily responded to 
advertisements offering 1 Euro and a chocolate bar in return for taking part in an experiment 
labeled “Evaluation of the university admissions process.” 1 All participants had applied for 
university admission through a national office (“Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von 
Studienplätzen”, ZVS). On average, participants had studied for 6.5 semesters (SD = 4.0) and 
were 24.2 years of age (SD = 3.7). From the 26 participants in the writing condition three did not 
generate any unfair aspects and were therefore excluded from the analysis. This proceeding did 
not affect any of the reported significance levels. Additionally, the aspects of one participant in 
the writing condition were not readable; therefore only 22 participants were assessed in the 
reading condition.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were assigned to a 2 (number of aspects: few vs. many) x 2 (task: writing vs. 
reading) factorial design. Due to yoking readers to writers, the reading condition was assessed 
after the writing condition. Both writers and readers were randomly assigned to the number of 
aspects conditions. 
All participants first responded to demographic questions concerning their own university 
application. Afterwards, writers were asked to list either two or four unfair aspects of the ZVS-
procedure. At that time, the ZVS regulated the admission process to many subjects taught at 
German universities, including psychology. Students applied to the ZVS, and the ZVS then 
assigned prospective students to their future alma maters, taking certain criteria into account 
(e.g., performance in secondary school), while neglecting others (e.g., internships in related 
areas). As this procedure was highly standardized and involved virtually no personal contact, it 
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was an almost ideal evaluative target. Independent pre-testing had revealed that recalling two 
compared to four unfair aspects about this procedure is easier. To probe for the success of this 
manipulation, writers answered two manipulation-check questions. Note that the above ZVS 
description was not relayed to participants, so as to render experiences associated with 
information recall meaningful.  
Readers received individual questionnaires, each with the aspects generated by one of 
the writers.  
Dependent variables 
Ease-of-retrieval. Serving as a manipulation check, writers were asked ”How easy or 
difficult was it for you to list unfair aspects of the selection procedure of the ZVS?” and “How 
easy or difficult would it have been for you to list more unfair aspects?” Answers were given on 
9-point rating scales (1, very difficult; 9, very easy; Cronbach’s  = .92).  
Procedural justice. Perceived procedural justice was assessed by asking how just 
(1, very unjust; 9, very just), fair (1, very unfair; 9, very fair), and appropriate (1, very 
inappropriate; 9, very appropriate) the ZVS-procedure was perceived (Cronbach’s  = .93).  
 Attitude toward the ZVS. All participants evaluated the ZVS by means of three items, 
which read: “The ZVS accomplishes the selection task very well,” “I think the ZVS is doing a 
good job,” and “The ZVS is a reasonable institution.” (1, do not at all agree; 9, completely agree; 
Cronbach’s  = .92). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
Writers answered two items indicating the ease or difficulty associated with recalling 
unfair aspects from memory. As expected, writers experienced generating two unfair aspects as 
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easier (M = 4.50, SD = 2.17) than generating four unfair aspects (M = 2.29, SD = 0.91), 
F(1, 21) = 10.45, p < .01, 2 = .33. 
Procedural justice  
Averaged procedural justice judgments were entered into a 2 (number of aspects: few 
vs. many) x 2 (task: writing vs. reading) ANOVA. No main effects for number of aspects, F < 1, 
and for task, F(1, 41) = 2.14, ns, emerged. However, as expected, an interaction effect was 
observed, F(1, 41) = 9.15, p < .01, 2 = .18 (see Table 1). Planned contrast analyses revealed 
that writers evaluated the ZVS procedure as less just after generating few rather than many 
unfair aspects, t(41) = -2.30, p < .05. In line with prior findings (Schwarz, 1998), this pattern of 
results suggests that writers relied on ease-of-retrieval experiences in forming procedural justice 
judgments. This conclusion is further corroborated by the finding that readers evaluated the ZVS 
procedure as more just after reading few rather than many unfair aspects, t(41) = 1.98, p < .05. 
Since readers could only draw on content information, it appears that the aspects in the few 
aspects condition were neither more extreme nor of higher quality than those in the many 
aspects condition. The pattern of results observed for writers is thus unlikely to be a disguised 
content effect, but best explained as reliance on ease-of-retrieval.  
Attitude toward the ZVS 
Averaged attitude towards the ZVS was positively correlated to perceived procedural 
justice, r = .79, p < .01, and entered into a 2 (number of aspects: few vs. many) x 2 (task: writing 
vs. reading) ANOVA. Again, the hypothesized interaction effect was observed, F(1, 41) = 8.67, 
p < .01, 2 = .18 (all other Fs < 1). Paralleling the pattern for procedural justice, writers’ attitude 
toward the ZVS was less favorable when few as opposed to many unfair aspects had been 
retrieved, t(41) = -1.86, p < .05 (ease-of-retrieval effect), whereas readers’ attitude toward the 
Beyond Procedure’s Content - 12 
ZVS as an institution was more favorable after reading few rather than many aspects, 
t(41) = 2.30, p < .05 (see Table 1).  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that participants’ evaluation of a nation-wide 
university admissions process, as well as their judgment about the institution overseeing the 
process, reflects the ease or difficulty with which information concerning the unfairness of the 
respective procedure could be brought to mind. Results strongly support this hypothesis, since 
writers judged the ZVS procedure as more just after recalling many compared to few unfair 
aspects. This conclusion is further corroborated by the finding that readers, who had only 
access to content information, showed the reverse pattern of results. Together, the observed 
findings suggest that justice judgments about a procedure for which uncertainty is not salient 
may be based on cognitive experiences triggered by the processing of justice information.  
Notably, the influence of ease-of-retrieval on procedural justice judgments was strong 
enough to affect the attitude toward the ZVS as the responsible organization. This is 
remarkable, as the latter constitutes a more distal judgment, that is supposedly influenced via 
the proximal variable of procedural justice (e.g., Colquitt, 2001). This finding directly attests to 
the importance of considering accessibility experiences when conceptualizing the formation of 
justice judgments. 
Experiment 1 revealed a clear pattern of results. However, one might argue that the 
reported effects were partly due to participants’ accessibility experiences being particularly 
salient. Following general practices in the literature (see Schwarz, 2004), the manipulation 
check in the writing condition was assessed before justice judgments, which might have unduly 
heightened the salience of retrieval fluency. To address this objection, the subsequent 
experiments assessed the manipulation check after justice judgments. 
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Note that Experiment 1 focused on a procedure which is unlikely to render uncertainty 
salient to the chosen population of university students, as it pertains to a previous life period. In 
line with the here advanced moderation hypothesis—uncertainty moderates reliance on 
accessibility experiences—this may have fostered the impact of ease-of-retrieval on justice 
judgments. To allow for the detection of content effects, Experiments 2 and 3 used a procedure 
that is related to students’ present life period (performance at university), and should therefore 
be associated with more personal uncertainty.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to shed light on the conditions that moderate individuals’ 
reliance on accessibility experiences. We hypothesized that personal uncertainty would be such 
a moderating capacity. This is because personal uncertainty has been shown to increase the 
relevance of justice concerns (e.g., De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005), and relevance, in turn, has 
been linked to differential information processing. Specifically, higher levels of relevance are 
generally assumed to be associated with more systematic or careful processing, and lower 
levels with less taxing judgmental strategies (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999), such as reliance on 
accessibility experiences (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In line with this reasoning, it has 
been observed that ease-of-retrieval experiences are relied upon in conditions of low but not 
high motivation (e.g., Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). By linking this prior research with the 
literature on personal uncertainty (e.g., Hogg, 2005; Lopes, 1987; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), 
the present experiment addresses the hypothesis that accessibility experiences are used in 
conditions of personal certainty, but not personal uncertainty.  
Similar to prior research (e.g., De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005), personal uncertainty was 
operationalized as self-perceived instability of self-esteem and assessed as a dispositional 
measure. To manipulate ease-of-retrieval, participants were asked to name either few or many 
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unfair aspects of a procedure named “Orientierungsprüfung” (in the following referred to as 
“orientation exam”). The orientation exam needs to be passed by all students in Baden-
Württemberg—the federal German state in which the University of Mannheim is located—after 
the first year of study. The exam tests the knowledge that is supposedly critical to the 
completion of a degree in a particular field. If a student fails to pass the orientation exam by the 
third semester (1.5 years), the student looses the right to study this particular subject at any 
German university. This procedure has been the subject of strong controversy and therefore 
was as an ideal evaluative target. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred male University of Mannheim students of various disciplines voluntarily 
responded to advertisements offering 1 Euro and a chocolate bar. On average, participants had 
studied for 4.9 semesters (SD = 4.3) and were 24.1 years of age (SD = 7.2). Fifty-six percent of 
participants had already passed the orientation exam.2 Five participants did not list any unfair 
aspects of the orientation exam procedure and were therefore excluded from further analyses. 
None of the reported significance levels was affected by this exclusion.  
Design and Procedure 
Accessibility experiences were manipulated by asking participants to retrieve either two 
or four unfair aspects about the orientation exam from memory. Independent pre-testing had 
revealed that recalling two unfair aspects is easy, whereas recalling four unfair aspects is 
difficult. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. Participants were 
then asked to evaluate the orientation exam procedure and, as a measure of organizational 
attractiveness, to evaluate a university that is using such a procedure voluntarily. Finally, 
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personal uncertainty was assessed by means of the Labile Self-Esteem Scale (LSES; Dykman, 
1998; see also De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005), a 5-item measure designed to assess the 
perceived instability of one’s self-esteem. One example item from the LSES reads: “I’m often 
feeling good about myself one minute, and down the next one.” (1, not characteristic for me; 
5, extremely characteristic for me; Cronbach’s  = .88). In line with De Cremer and Sedikides 
(2005), it was assumed that participants who perceive their self-esteem as fluctuating are more 
personally uncertain than participants who perceive their self-esteem as stable. Additionally, in 
order to probe for possible effects of trait self-esteem on justice judgments and information 
processing, Robins, Hendin, and Trzesniewski’s (2001) 1-item measure for self-esteem was 
assessed. This item reads “In general, I have high self-esteem” (1, do not at all agree; 9, agree 
completely). 
Dependent variables 
Procedural justice and organizational attractiveness. Procedural justice judgments were 
assessed with the same three items as in Experiment 1 (Cronbach’s  = .86). Organizational 
attractiveness was assessed with three items, reading, for example, “If somebody I know is 
about to decide at which university to study, I would recommend this university.” (1, do not at all 
agree; 9, completely agree; Cronbach’s  = .89).  
Ease-of-retrieval. In Experiments 2 and 3, the manipulation check questions were 
assessed following dependent variables. This was to demonstrate that assessing the 
manipulation check before target variables is not a necessary precondition for individuals to rely 
on ease-of-retrieval experiences. Similar to Experiment 1, two items queried how easy versus 
difficult participants experienced the recall of aspects from memory (Cronbach’s  = .90). 
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Results 
Manipulation check 
Reflecting a successful manipulation, participants recalling two aspects perceived the 
task as easier (M = 3.52, SD = 2.03) than those recalling four aspects (M = 2.60, SD = 1.88), 
F(1, 93) = 5.19, p < .05, η2 = .05. 
 Personal uncertainty and self-esteem 
For the LSES-items assessing personal uncertainty, the sample mean was M = 2.43 
(SD = 0.84; Mdn = 2.4). For self-esteem, the sample mean was M = 6.07 (SD = 1.71; 
Mdn = 6.0). The two experimental groups—recalling few versus many aspects of the exam 
procedure—did not reliably differ in personal uncertainty (M = 2.33, SD = 0.78; M = 2.52, 
SD = 0.90), F(1, 93) = 1.16, ns., or in self-esteem (M = 6.15, SD = 1.69; M = 6.00, SD = 1.74), 
F < 1. Following suggestions by De Cremer and Sedikides (2005), self-esteem was preliminarily 
included in all of the subsequent analyses as a covariate to control for possible general effects 
of level of self-esteem. However, as no effects were found, all |t|s < 1, self-esteem was dropped 
from the analyses reported below.  
To ensure that level of personal uncertainty had no influence on the ease or difficulty with 
which aspects could be retrieved from memory, a hierarchical regression analysis was 
conducted using the number of aspects and personal uncertainty as predictors and the z-
standardized ease-of-retrieval index as criterion. Following Aiken and West (1991), personal 
uncertainty was z-standardized in all of the following analyses. The dummy-coded number of 
aspects factor (few = 0, many = 1) and the continuous personal uncertainty score were entered 
as predictors in Step 1, and the interaction term was entered in Step 2. Only a significant effect 
of number of aspects was found, β = -.24, t(91) = -2.32, p < .03; all other |t|s < 1.05, ns. These 
results suggest that perceived ease-of-retrieval was unaffected by personal uncertainty, which is 
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a necessary precondition for sound inferences from results obtained with the ease-of-retrieval 
paradigm (Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). 
Procedural justice 
Procedural justice judgments were averaged, z-standardized, and entered as dependent 
variable in a hierarchical regression analysis. Number of aspects and personal uncertainty were 
entered as predictors in Step 1; the interaction term was entered in Step 2. Procedural justice 
judgments were neither predicted by number of aspects nor by personal uncertainty, |t|s < 1. 
However, as expected, the interaction of personal uncertainty and number of aspects was 
significant, β = -.49, t(91) = -3.26, p < .01, ΔR2 = .10. To further explore this interaction, simple 
slopes—depicted in Figure 1—were analyzed following Aiken and West (1991). For personally 
certain participants, one standard deviation below the mean, a positive slope emerged, β = .34, 
t(91) = 2.37, p < .03, indicating that the procedure was rated as less just after retrieving few 
compared to many unjust aspects. Presumably, this reflects reliance on ease-of-retrieval. 
Conversely, for personally uncertain participants, one standard deviation above the mean, a 
negative slope was observed, β = -.32, t(91) = -2.26, p < .03, indicating that the procedure was 
rated as more just after retrieving few compared to many unjust aspects. Presumably, this 
reflects reliance on content information. For the average rating on personal uncertainty, the 
slope was non-significant, |t| < 1. 
Organizational attractiveness 
Averaged organizational attractiveness judgments were positively correlated to 
procedural justice, r = .63, p < .01, z-standardized, and entered as criterion variable in the 
described hierarchical regression analysis. Organizational attractiveness was neither predicted 
by the number of aspects nor by personal uncertainty, |t|s < 1, The interaction term, however, 
significantly predicted organizational attractiveness, β = -.36, t(91) = -2.32, p < .03, ΔR2 = .06. 
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Simple slope analysis suggests that personally certain participants (one standard deviation 
below the mean) who had to generate few aspects rated the university as less attractive than 
participants who had to generate many aspects, β = .31, t(91) = 2.14, p < .05, reflecting an 
ease-of-retrieval effect. When personal uncertainty was high, one standard deviation above the 
mean, there was a non-significant difference between participants who had to generate few 
versus many unfair aspects, β = -.17, t(91) = -1.17, ns; for the average rating on personal 
uncertainty, |t| < 1.  
Additional analyses 
Alternatively to the suggested ease-of-retrieval explanation, one may speculate that the 
pattern of results observed for personally certain individuals was due to conditions differing in 
the quality of the retrieved aspects. To refute this speculation, two independent judges, blind to 
hypotheses and experimental conditions, rated each aspect’s quality or compellingness (1, low 
quality; 5, high quality). Average interrater reliability over all four aspects was high 
(Cohen’s  = .87). Analyses revealed that the average quality of aspects did not differ as a 
function of the number of aspects generated (M = 3.23, SD = 1.01 vs. M = 3.06, SD = 0.94), 
F < 1. Also, the quality of the last aspect a participant had retrieved did not differ between 
conditions (M = 3.05, SD = 1.32; M = 2.94, SD = 1.32), F < 1.  
Similarly, using hierarchical regression analysis, we probed whether level of personal 
uncertainty influenced the aspects’ quality. However, neither the dummy-coded number of 
aspects nor personal uncertainty, |t|s < 1, nor their interaction, β = -.21, t(91) = 1.33, were 
significant predictors of average quality. Analogous results were found for the quality of the last 
argument. Together, these results suggest that the pattern of results observed is unlikely to be 
due to differences in content quality. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 set out to test the hypothesis that individuals’ reliance on accessibility 
experiences when forming procedural justice judgments is moderated by dispositional personal 
uncertainty. It was found that personally certain individuals relied on accessibility experiences to 
form procedural justice judgments, whereas personally uncertain individuals relied more on 
accessible content information. Several aspects of these findings deserve mention. First, one 
could have argued that the ease-of-retrieval effect observed in Experiment 1 was due to 
assessing the manipulation check prior to dependent variables, thereby heightening the salience 
of accessibility experiences. To address this concern, the manipulation check was assessed 
after dependent variables in Experiment 2. As personally certain participants still displayed an 
ease-of-retrieval effect, it appears safe to suggest that the results observed in Experiment 1 
were due neither to undue heightening of salience nor to conversational logic. This is of interest 
in light of recent speculations that ease-of-retrieval effects are confined to situations where the 
manipulation check is assessed first (Kühnen, 2010). Second, the results of Experiment 2 
replicate those of Experiment 1 with a different procedure that pertains to participants’ current 
life period. Arguably, because this procedure is associated with higher levels of uncertainty in 
the present population of university students, the general ease-of-retrieval effect observed in 
Experiment 1 was now confined to self-certain participants. Third, the obtained moderation 
effect—personally certain individuals relied on subjective experiences whereas personally 
uncertain individuals did not—extends prior research in the domains of justice and uncertainty 
as well as social cognition, as it allows for conclusions about when individuals are likely to rely 
on ease-of-retrieval in judgment (see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005, for why this is important).  
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Experiment 3 
The findings reported in Experiment 2 were based on participants’ self-reported 
uncertainty and thus leave room for alternative causal explanations about the observed 
differences in information use. For example, other interpersonal differences related to personal 
uncertainty could have caused part of the effect. To strengthen and replicate the observed 
findings, Experiment 3 was designed to experimentally manipulate personal uncertainty (vs. 
certainty). This was achieved by asking participants to answer two open-ended questions about 
their emotions and physical sensations in different conditions. This manipulation influences the 
salience of uncertainty-related thoughts while presumably not eliciting affective differences 
between experimental groups (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001). To rule out effects of the salience 
manipulation on the quality of the generated aspects, the salience manipulation was instigated 
after unfair aspects were generated. If uncertainty was manipulated prior to the generation of 
unfair aspects, uncertainty would have affected the generation of aspects and reliance on 
retrieval experiences. The hypothesized judgmental pattern could then be due to the effects of 
either or even both processes, thus precluding strong conclusions about moderation (see 
Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). 
Method 
Participants 
After responding to advertisement offering 1 Euro and a chocolate bar, 131 University of 
Mannheim students participated in an experiment labeled “Evaluation of the orientation exam.” 
Forty-nine percent of participants were females. Participants’ gender did not significantly 
influence control or dependent variables, neither as a main effect nor in interactions with the 
other two factors, and was therefore not included in the analyses. On average, participants’ had 
studied for 4.2 semesters (SD = 3.2) and were 22.4 years of age (SD = 2.9). Fifty-seven percent 
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of participants had already passed the orientation exam.3 Most likely due to the experimental 
setting in a university cafeteria, 33 participants did not note any unfair aspects of the orientation 
exam procedure and therefore had to be excluded from the analyses. The number of 
participants per condition after the exclusion ranged from 14 to 18. None of the significance 
levels reported in the following were affected by this exclusion, most likely because merely 
imaging to retrieve few or many instances engenders ease-of-retrieval effects, too (see Wänke, 
Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997). 
Design, Procedure, and Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (number of aspects: few vs. many) x 
3 (salience: uncertainty salient vs. certainty salient vs. control) factorial design. Apart from the 
following modification, procedure and materials were similar to those used in Experiment 2. After 
retrieving either two or four unfair aspects, (un)certainty was made salient by asking participants 
to imagine emotions and physical sensations in a specific condition (see Van den Bos, 2001). 
Participants in the uncertainty (certainty) condition were asked to imagine being someone who 
feels uncertain (certain), and then to respond to the following two questions: “What emotions 
does the thought of your being uncertain (certain) about yourself arouse in you?,” and “What will 
happen physically to you as you feel uncertain (certain) about yourself?” Participants in the 
control condition were asked to imagine being someone who watches TV, and then to answer 
the following questions: “What emotions does the thought of you watching TV arouse in you?,” 
and “What will happen physically to you as you watch TV?”.  
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Results 
Manipulation check 
The two items assessing accessibility experiences were averaged (Cronbach’s  = .88). 
This index was entered into a 2 (number of aspects: few vs. many) x 3 (salience: uncertainty 
salient vs. certainty salient vs. control) ANOVA. As expected, retrieving two compared to four 
unfair aspects was experienced as easier (M = 3.05, SD = 2.19; M = 2.23, SD = 1.77), 
F(1, 92) = 3.96, p < .05, η2 = .04 (all other Fs < 1).  
Procedural justice 
Procedural justice judgments were averaged (Cronbach’s  = .87), and were entered into 
a 2 (number of aspects: few vs. many) x 3 (salience: uncertainty salient vs. certainty salient vs. 
control) ANOVA. No significant main effect of salience on procedural justice ratings was 
observed, F(2, 92) = 1.66, ns, but there was a tendency for procedural justice judgments being 
higher after retrieving many rather than few aspects, F(1, 92) = 3.08, p < .10, 2 = .03. This 
effect was qualified by the predicted significant interaction between number of aspects and 
salience, F(2, 92) = 3.25, p < .05, 2 = .07 (see Table 2). Replicating Experiment 2, certainty 
salient participants rated the procedure as less just after retrieving few rather than many 
aspects, t(92) = -3.03, p < .01, reflecting reliance on ease-of-retrieval. In contrast, uncertainty 
salient participants displayed a non-significant tendency of evaluating the exam procedures 
more positively after retrieving few rather than many aspects, |t| < 1, reflecting a tendency to rely 
on content information. Participants in the control condition judged the procedure non-
significantly more just after retrieving many compared to few aspects, |t| < 1.  
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Organizational attractiveness 
Organizational attractiveness items were averaged (Cronbach’s  = .87). This index was 
positively related to procedural justice judgments, r = .61, p < .01 and was entered into the 
described ANOVA. There was no significant effect of salience on organizational attractiveness 
ratings, F < 1, but the organization was perceived as more attractive after recalling many 
(M = 6.57, SD = 1.68) rather than few aspects (M = 5.76, SD = 1.93), F(1, 92) = 4.34, p < .05, 
2 = .05. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 92) = 1.21, ns. Potentially, the interaction term 
failed to reach significance because organizational attractiveness is a more distal judgment, 
which is influenced via the more proximal variable of procedural justice, for which a significant 
effect was observed. However, planned contrasts revealed a pattern similar to that reported for 
procedural justice judgments: Certainty-salient participants who had to generate few aspects 
rated the organization as less attractive than those who had to generate many aspects, t(92) = -
2.36, p < .01 (ease-of-retrieval effect). For uncertainty-salient as well as control participants, 
judgments of organizational attractiveness were not significantly different after retrieving few as 
compared to many aspects, |ts| < 1.  
Additional analyses 
To refute alternative explanations, two independent raters, blind to hypotheses and 
experimental conditions, judged each aspect on a 5-point scale (1, low quality, to 5, high quality; 
Cohen’s  = .57). The average quality of all aspects, and the quality of the last aspect, were 
separately entered into 2 (number of aspects: few vs. many) x 3 (salience: uncertainty salient vs. 
certainty salient vs. control) ANOVAs. As no significant effects emerged (all Fs < 1.87), it 
appears safe to conclude that the observed pattern of results is not due to differences in quality 
of the retrieved aspects.  
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Discussion 
Experiment 3 substantiates the hypothesis that participants in conditions of certainty 
salience rely on ease-of-retrieval when forming justice judgments. Participants in conditions of 
uncertainty salience did not show an according pattern of results, presumably because 
uncertainty increases the relevance of justice concerns and careful processing of content 
information. In contrast to Experiment 2, the content effect in conditions of uncertainty salience 
was less pronounced. Potentially, this was due to the experimental setting. Whereas 
Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted in the laboratory, data for Experiment 3 was collected in 
one of the university’s cafeterias. This less standardized environment may have decreased 
participants’ compliance with experimental procedures (causing the relatively high number of 
participants unwilling to retrieve unfair aspects) as well as their motivation when forming 
judgments. As conditions of low motivation are known to foster reliance on ease-of-retrieval 
(e.g., Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), it appears reasonable to assume that all participants relied 
relatively more on ease-of-retrieval than participants in Experiments 1 and 2, thus attenuating 
potential content effects. Notably, however, this does not limit the interpretability of the observed 
results, because both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that mainly content-based information 
processing in procedural justice judgments is possible under conditions where no accessibility 
experiences are present (readers in Experiment 1) or when individuals are dispositionally 
uncertain and therefore highly motivated to form accurate judgments (Experiment 2). In fact, the 
incomplete reversal in Experiment 3 may be interpreted as strengthening our claim that 
accessibility experiences play a critical role in procedural justice judgments.  
General Discussion 
Justice concerns play a critical role in many domains of human life (Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002). While their direct impact, as well as their influence on other important parameters such 
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as organizational attractiveness (e.g., Colquitt, 2001), are well recognized in the literature (for 
meta-analytic overviews, see Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001), much less 
is known about how procedural justice judgments are formed. To date, most conceptions define 
content information, such as characteristics of the procedure (Folger, 1977), as the main source 
of judgment relevant information. Extending this perspective, three experiments revealed that 
individuals may also rely on accessibility experiences to form justice judgments. Across 
experiments, participants evaluated procedures as more just after recalling many rather than 
few unfair aspects, presumably because the experienced difficulty associated with recalling 
many aspects implied that there are only few unfair aspects to the procedure, whereas the 
experienced ease associated with recalling few aspects implied that there are many unfair 
aspects.  
Several aspects of these findings deserve high-lighting. First, the ease-of-retrieval 
pattern replicated across samples and target procedures, thus speaking to the general nature of 
the reported effect. 
Second, the ease-of-retrieval effect was independent of whether the manipulation check 
was assessed prior to (Experiment 1) or after (Experiments 2 and 3) the dependent variables, 
suggesting that ease-of-retrieval effects are not limited to situations in which the salience of 
accessibility experiences has been experimentally heightened. This finding qualifies the recent 
claim that ease-of-retrieval effects are confined to situations when the manipulation check is 
assessed first (Kühnen, 2010). Although speculative, it would appear that the mere positioning 
of the manipulation check is not primary. Future research may fruitfully look at the processes 
underlying the repositioning of manipulation checks, such as the ensuing salience of cognitive 
feelings (e.g., Hansen & Wänke, 2008). 
Third, in Experiments 2 and 3, the hypothesized effects did not reliably differ for 
participants who had already passed the respective target procedures compared to those who 
had not. The influence of accessibility experiences on procedural justice judgments is thus 
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unlikely to be limited to procedures that have already been completed and lie in the past, but 
applies to procedures individuals are still experiencing, too. However, it would appear that the 
less uncertainty arousing a procedure is (e.g., because it pertains to a previous life period, as in 
Experiment 1), the more ease-of-retrieval experiences are relied upon.  
Fourth, in addition to showing that procedural justice judgments can be influenced by 
ease-of-retrieval, the present contribution offers deeper insight as to when this source of 
information is relied upon. Building on current models of uncertainty management (e.g., Van den 
Bos & Lind, 2002) and dual-process theories of attitude and judgment formation (e.g., Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999), it was hypothesized and found that habitually certain participants as well as 
participants to whom personal certainty had been made salient relied more on their experiences 
of ease or difficulty than participants in conditions of personal uncertainty. Presumably, this was 
because individuals in conditions of personal uncertainty were more motivated to form accurate 
justice judgments in order to reduce this uncertainty, as suggested by the uncertainty 
management model, and therefore engaged in more systematic processing of content 
information. In contrast, for individuals in conditions of personal certainty, careful processing of 
content information may have been less relevant and internal cues safe to rely on, resulting in 
more pronounced influence of ease-of-retrieval.  
Finally, the present findings complement and add to research in the realm of cooperation 
behavior, which observed that accessibility experiences influence social interaction behavior in 
conditions of personal certainty (Müller et al., 2010). This correspondence is noteworthy 
because it suggests that similar mechanisms may inform judgment formation and behavior 
regulation. Moreover, it may indicate that accessibility experiences are perceived as informative 
for both highly complex social interactions (multi-round principal agent games) and presumably 
less complex evaluative targets (admission and exam procedures). And it suggests that 
accessibility experiences are informative in many different domains, for which justice 
considerations may be more or less salient, thus attesting to the findings’ generalizability. The 
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present results thus strongly extend earlier findings (Müller et al., 2010), which were limited to a 
particular behavioral manifestation, while being silent about other critical aspects in justice 
research.  
Going beyond the observed evidence, at least four theoretical considerations appear 
noteworthy. First, it is interesting to note that the present ease-of-retrieval hypothesis 
corresponds to norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Norm theory—which bears many 
similarities with current models of justice judgment formation—assumes that the weights of 
different counterfactual elements are determined by their availability (accessibility). Since norms 
and deviations from norms are integral parts of justice perceptions, it would appear that 
accessibility experiences play a vital role in the formation of procedural justice judgments, too, 
as demonstrated in the present contribution. 
Second, with respect to the literature on uncertainty, the present findings suggest that 
uncertainty or uncertainty-related states not only cause stronger reactions to just or unjust 
events (e.g., De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005), but may also trigger differential reliance on 
available information sources. To date, such a moderating influence is not a common part in 
models conceptualizing the impact of uncertainty (or related approaches, such as fairness 
heuristic theory, e.g., Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001), and therefore suggests intriguing 
venues for future research.  
Interestingly, the finding that ease-of-retrieval is relied on in conditions of personal 
certainty may appear to clash with the work on “judgments under uncertainty” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), which holds that uncertainty fosters the use of heuristics or short-cuts. Yet, 
this contradiction is not really genuine, because the opposing perspectives integrate very well if 
one looks more closely at the different types of uncertainty investigated. The present 
contribution focused on personal uncertainty. In contrast, prior work in the domain of decision 
making often focused on uncertainty resulting from ambiguity or a lack of information, which has 
been referred to as informational uncertainty and is characterized by incomplete information 
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(see Van den Bos & Lind, 2009). With informational uncertainty, content information is likely 
perceived as undiagnostic, and individuals may recur to other, apparently unrelated sources of 
information, like ease-of-retrieval or affective feelings (Van den Bos, 2003). In conditions of 
personal uncertainty, however, individuals may not harbor doubts about the validity of retrieved 
content information, because the experienced uncertainty is not related to the informational 
basis. Systematic or careful processing of content information is therefore likely for conditions of 
personal uncertainty, as observed in the present experiments.  
Third, the present findings are of interest in light of earlier evidence suggesting that 
individuals react more strongly to stimuli perceived as fair versus unfair in conditions of 
uncertainty (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001). From this earlier evidence, one may venture the 
hypothesis that accessibility experiences—which we showed to be relied upon in conditions of 
personal certainty—rarely come to play. However, because earlier research focused on 
reactions to events already judged as just versus unjust, whereas the present findings focus on 
how these justice judgments are formed, such conclusions are not self-evident. In contrast, 
there is another possibility, which is more akin to the causal order of the formation of, and 
subsequent reactions to, justice judgments. Specifically, we speculate that affective reactions to 
stimuli judged as fair versus unfair may be less strong when these judgments were formed on 
the basis of accessibility experiences. This is because conditions of certainty foster reliance on 
accessibility experiences, but presumably result in less strong affective reactions to these 
judgments. Unfortunately, the present findings do not allow for answering this interesting 
question, but trace the path for future work on the role and consequences of uncertainty.  
Finally, with respect to the literature on ease-of-retrieval, the present moderation finding 
allows for further insight as to when or how often individuals rely on ease-of-retrieval in judgment 
formation. Intriguingly, since individuals are motivated to reduce uncertainty, one may speculate 
that states of certainty are more common than states of uncertainty, which in turn allows for the 
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conclusion that reliance on accessibility experiences in judgment formation is a common 
judgmental pathway, perhaps more common than systematic integration of content information.  
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Footnotes 
1 Only male participants were invited to take part in Experiments 1 and 2. A mixed sample was 
invited for Experiment 3. 
2 Participants’ examination status did not significantly influence procedural justice judgments or 
organizational attractiveness, neither as a main effect nor in interactions with the other two 
factors. Accordingly, exam status was not included in the reported analyses. The fact that 
exam status did not influence the observed findings may appear surprising at first glance, 
because one might suspect that a procedure triggers less uncertainty in those who have 
successfully passed it. However, the particular procedure chosen in the present experiment—
the orientation exam—still pertains to students’ current life period (with an uncertain outcome) 
and may still decide about the fate of close friends. It is therefore likely to be associated with 
uncertainty even for students who have successfully passed it.  
3  Participants who had already passed the orientation exam rated the procedure as more just 
(M = 6.22, SD = 1.87) than participants who had not passed the exam yet (M = 4.65, 
SD = 2.07), F(1, 83) = 12.47, p < .01. Participants who had already passed the orientation 
exam also rated the university as more attractive (M = 6.57, SD = 1.82) than participants who 
had not yet passed the exam (M = 5.62, SD = 1.78), F(1, 83) = 6.03, p < .05. However, 
examination status did not significantly interact with the experimental manipulations and did 
not change the statistical significance of the results reported for procedural justice and 
organizational attractiveness. Therefore, the factor was not included in the reported analyses.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Means (with Standard Deviations) of Procedural Justice Judgments and Attitude toward the ZVS 
as a Function of Task and Number of Aspects in Experiment 1. 
 Number of aspects 
Task Few Many 
Procedural justice 
Writing 2.73 (1.12) 4.50 (1.86) 
Reading 5.20 (1.59) 3.64 (2.45) 
Attitude toward the ZVS 
Writing 2.88 (1.38) 4.44 (1.89) 
Reading 5.23 (2.25) 3.25 (2.39) 
Notes. Means are on 9-point scales, higher values indicate higher levels of procedural justice or 
attitude toward the ZVS.  
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Table 2 
Means (with Standard Deviations) of Procedural Justice Judgments and Organizational 
Attractiveness as a Function of Salience and Number of Aspects in Experiment 3. 
 Number of aspects 
Salience Few Many 
Procedural justice 
Uncertainty 6.33 (1.16) 5.90 (1.79) 
Certainty 4.37 (2.26) 6.41 (1.72) 
Television 5.02 (2.30) 5.53 (2.35) 
Organizational attractiveness 
Uncertainty 6.38 (1.62) 6.57 (1.62) 
Certainty 5.20 (1.92) 6.72 (1.90) 
Television 5.82 (2.10) 6.40 (1.52) 
Notes. Means are on 9-point scales, higher values indicate higher levels of procedural justice or 
organizational attractiveness.  
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Procedural justice judgments (z-standardized) as a function of number of aspects and 
personal (un)certainty in Experiment 2. Higher values indicate higher levels of procedural justice 
judgments. 
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